

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Approved For Release 2001/11/08 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000300060014-1

Date: 9 Nov 78

TO: DCI

FROM: George

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S NOTES

REMARKS:

Editing/clean up of Director's Notes
on Secrecy and Press, Courts, Academia, etc.

VR
George

OPA has seen.



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DRAFT DIRECTOR'S NOTE

Secrecy and the Press

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On 16 October, I addressed the National Press Club here in Washington. In my remarks, I discussed the similarity between the problem which the media professions face today in protecting their sources of information and our problem of protecting our sources of intelligence. Recently, New York Times reporter, Myron Farber, refused to disclose his sources for a series of newspaper articles when they were demanded as vital to the defense in a murder trial. As a consequence, Mr. Farber went to jail for 40 days and the New York Times was fined. Clearly, it was not an easy decision by either Mr. Farber or the New York Times to withhold information that a defendant felt might prove his innocence. Yet they did so on the larger principle of their interpretation of the rights of the press under the Constitution.

In my talk I pointed out that while our problems of protecting sources are analogous, the CIA's obligation is rather more clear cut. I am required by specific provision of law (the National Security Act of 1947) to protect our sources and methods of collecting intelligence from unauthorized disclosure, whereas the right of the press to do so depends on an interpretation of a constitutional amendment which has been questioned of late by the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it is always a difficult decision for either of us to determine what disclosures would truly jeopardize our sources. In our case, we do not determine whether such jeopardy would outweigh the benefits to our country of prosecuting an offender in the courts. We simply make known what we expect the damage of

revealing classified information would be.

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In sum, both we and the press are regularly confronted with the need to balance the long-term impact of disclosing sensitive information on our ability to continue our respective contributions to society versus the benefit to society of prosecuting alleged offenses against the law.

Secrecy and Academia

There has been considerable discussion of the guidelines Harvard University issued some time ago addressing the relationship between the Intelligence Community and Harvard University. We worked closely with Harvard when these guidelines were being drawn up and agree ^{with} and endorse most of ~~the~~ ^{the} provisions. However, we have taken exception to those provisions which unfairly single out the Intelligence Community for unique treatment or which prejudice the rights of individual Harvard faculty members to associate with us or anyone else of their choice. I have pointed out in public remarks and in replies to letters and editorials that any set of university guidelines or regulations ultimately apply only to that university and are not laws which apply to any other organization. Even if it were feasible for us or other government agencies to attempt to comply with the individual regulations of each university in the country, which it is not, it is unreasonable to expect such compliance.

At the same time, I stress that we do, in fact, sincerely try to comply with these regulations insofar as we possibly can. ^{University} But, ^{who prefers to his University's regulations,} when it is necessary to ^{even we work with an academic} contravene them, such a decision is carefully thought through, and conforms to our own internal regulations which require that decision be approved at a high level. Further, ^{for} we will not undertake activities with respect to the US academic community which we believe ^{for} would be in the best interests of the United States.

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Our relations with the American academic community are very important to us and

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Further, level. ~~We~~ will not undertake activities with respect to the US academic community which we believe would be inimical to the best interests of that community.

Our relations with the American academic community are very important to us and in most respects

To bring you up to date on the prosecution of individuals who violated their ~~Secrecy~~ ^Agreement or released secrets without proper authorization, the present status is:

- Former employee Frank Snepp has been convicted by the District Court of Alexandria of violating the contract of his Secrecy Agreement. His appeal of this finding ^{is being} ~~will be~~ heard by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia ^{and began} ~~beginning~~ on Wednesday, 15 November 1978.

STATINTL - Former employee [REDACTED] was accused of committing espionage by delivering a classified document to agents of the Soviet Union. He is presently on trial in Hammond, Indiana.

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Secrecy and Basic Policy

I would like to reemphasize that we are pursuing simultaneously two courses toward improved security. One is to be more open with the product of intelligence - the estimates, analyses and studies - when they can be properly declassified. The other course is to tighten dissemination control of information which cannot or should not be declassified. The ~~de~~ declassification policy helps us to reduce the total number of classified documents in an orderly and authorized way, leaving us with fewer genuinely sensitive documents to protect. It ensures that we are not attempting to protect unclassified materials when we do not need to. *The policy of enhanced emphasis on security regulations & procedures is very important at this time.*

I am grateful for the indications which I see around ~~the~~ Headquarters of your improved awareness of the importance of following sound security procedures.

In particular, I appreciate your cooperation in the inspections of briefcases and packages being taken out of our buildings. *This program is going*

Executive Assistant _____

Cassette 25
SIDE A
0 - 1/7

Military Assistant _____

Writer *[Signature]*

Executive Secretary *[Signature]*

5/10/78
Dezyl
Alan W. P.S.
Dme + enclosed -
VR
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Tape 25
Side A, 0- 1/8

Secrecy--and the Courts

To keep you up to date on the actions we are taking with respect to prosecuting people who violate their secrecy agreements or release secrets, the present status is:

- Former employee Frank Snepp has been convicted of violating the contract of his Secrecy Agreement by the District Court in Alexandria. He has appealed this finding. It is expected that his appeal will be heard by the Appeals Court in ___ very shortly.
- Former employee [REDACTED] who was accused of a espionage in the form of delivering/classified document to the Soviet Union, is presently on trial in [REDACTED]

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Article appeared
on page A-5

Turner Accused of Slanting Reports to Fit Carter Policy

New York Times News Service

CIA Director Stansfield Turner is being accused in the intelligence community of distorting estimates to make them dovetail with the Carter administration's foreign policy. He denies the allegations, saying that he has no policymaking role but that "it is mandatory that I present good estimates."

The estimates cover long-range prognoses on such issues as Soviet military capabilities, the balance of forces on the Korean Peninsula, Soviet strategic intentions in the Indian Ocean and the outlook for energy production worldwide, particularly in the Soviet Union. Often they form a basis for far-reaching policy decisions by the president on foreign relations and defense priorities.

One of Turner's critics, an official in the intelligence community, said,

"Turner has been highly dissatisfied with a large number of national intelligence estimates, and he has been more demanding and more preemptive than any director of central intelligence in recent times."

Some critics say that redrafted estimates of Soviet intentions ordered by Turner end up with a predictable bias toward gloom.

In an interview, Turner acknowledged that he had heavily involved himself in the production of the so-called national intelligence estimates — considered the most important product of the American intelligence community — as well as in lesser estimate and analysis functions.

However, he maintained that he had neither distorted estimates nor manipulated them to serve White House policy goals.

Tape 33
Side A, 0- 1/16

6 NOV 1978

D R A F T Director's Note Outline

1. Secrecy--and the Press
2. Secrecy--and Academia
3. Secrecy--Basic Policy
4. Secrecy--and the Courts
5. Secrecy--Briefcase Inspections

(do that as an outline--I'll try to come back to them here now)

***O. S. Turner, 79,
CIA Chief's Father,
Ex-Realty Broker***

Oliver Stansfield Turner, 79, a retired Chicago real estate man and father of Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, died Saturday at the University of Virginia Hospital in Charlottesville, Va., of renal failure.

Mr. Turner was born in Lancashire, England. He moved to the United States as a boy, and later entered the real estate business in Chicago. He and his wife moved to Charlottesville in 1969.

In addition to his son, who lives in Washington, Mr. Turner is survived by his wife, the former Wilhelmina Wagner, of the home in Charlottesville.

Tape 33

Side A, 1/16 - 1 1/2

DRAFT DIRECTOR'S NOTE

Secrecy--and the Press

On 16 October, I addressed the National Press Club of Washington. I talked about the similarity of the problem which the media profession faces today in protecting its sources of information and our problem in protecting ^{our} intelligence sources of information, and in fact protecting sources of intelligence. New York Times reporter ^{MYRON} Farber recently refused to disclose certain of his source information when demanded by the defense in a murder trial. Clearly, it was not easy either for Mr. Farber to go to jail for 40 days or the New York Times to pay fines in this instance, or for both to withhold information that a man felt he needed in order to defend himself and his life. Yet they did so on the larger principle of their interpretation of the rights of the press under the Constitution. In my talk I pointed out that we have an analogous problem in protecting our sources of information. Moreover, we are required to do this by law (the National Security Act of 1947 requires that the DCI protect our sources and methods of collecting intelligence from unauthorized disclosure). Similarly with us, it is always a difficult decision as to what disclosures would truly jeopardize our sources. Further, it is not our position to determine whether such jeopardy would outweigh the benefits to our country of prosecution in the courts. We simply make known what we expect the damage would be. In sum, both we and the press are regularly confronted with important issues here of balancing the long-term impact of disclosing information on our ability to continue our respective

CIA chief peddles goodwill

By JOHN DURHAM

The chief of the Central Intelligence Agency is on a goodwill swing through California and his message is openness.

Adm. Stansfield Turner, who served four Navy tours based in San Diego, returned yesterday for interviews, news conferences and a speech to the local establishment.

Today he is in Los Angeles for a town meeting and tomorrow he makes his way to Sacramento to talk to the Comstock Club.

On all the stops the theme will be basically the same: The CIA, thrust into the limelight by Vietnam and Watergate and buffeted by criticism of its role in Chile and Angola, has "come to operate in a much more open way than ever before in history."

The agency, Turner said at a joint San Diego Chamber of Commerce and Kiwanis Club lunch at El Cortez Hotel, is getting out of the spies-and-revolutions business and concentrating on gathering and analyzing information.

To launch a covert operation in a foreign country now, he said, the agency would need the blessing of President Carter and would have to brief congressional leaders.

And the CIA is making available more of its intelli-

gence information, he said.

"Being open is being American," Turner said. "No agency can remain effective unless it has the support of the American public."

He said in the past the intelligence community had the support of the public, but it was a backing granted "on faith."

Then, he said, when the CIA was intensely criticized in the mid-1970s, there was no reservoir of public support.

His current trip is aimed at building such a reservoir. The audience here, which included Mayor Wilson and a generous sprinkling of Navy brass, responded with warmth and enthusiasm.

Such speeches, which Turner and his top aide

make about a half-dozen times a month, are part of a three-pronged attempt to spread the gospel of an open agency, Turner said.

The other two tactics, he said, are increased frankness with the media and publishing information and reports such as forecasts of energy demands abroad.

Even with the new open atmosphere, Turner said, the CIA is not giving away the store.

"These are controlled disseminations, made by responsible officials. We are not simply opening the flood gates," he said.

"We are not telling every professional employee to go out and say what he wants to say. Some things must still remain secret," he said.

contributions to our society and the benefit to our society of prosecuting ~~and~~
our courts alleged offenses against our laws.

Secrecy--and Academia

There has ^{been} a good deal of discussion about the guidelines for association with the Intelligence Community which Harvard University issued some time ago. I have pointed out that ~~it would be~~ for the guidelines of any University, ~~as~~ applied to that University and are not laws which apply to other organizations. It would be unreasonable and infeasible for us or another other government agency to attempt to comply with the regulations of all the universities in our country. At the same time, we make a sincere effort to comply with those regulations insofar as we possibly can. When it is necessary to go contrary to them, we have procedures for high-level clearance to ⁱⁿ ~~ass~~ure that such decisions are carefully thought out. Moreover, our regulations are such that we are not undertaking activities with respect to the U.S. academic community which we believe would be inimical to that community. Our relations with the American academic community are very important to us and are very warm and constructive today. ~~(Go back and slip this sentence in somewhere in the early part--~~ We disagree with only a few provisions of the Harvard guidelines, provisions which we think unfairly single out the Intelligence Community or which prejudice the rights of individual members of Harvard to associate with us or others of their choice. ~~)~~

Secrecy--Basic Policy

I would like to reemphasize again that we are pursuing ^{simultaneous} ~~a~~ two/courses towards improved security. The one is to be more open with the product of intelligence

MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE
9 August 1978

The CIA and the integrity of the campuses

Harvard University is asking the Central Intelligence Agency to stop using its faculty members for secret operations and recruiting. That is a reasonable request. The CIA is balking, however, arguing that its secret campus activities are not illegal and that to suspend them would deprive the agency of important sources. Both sides have asked Congress to arbitrate the dispute.

The dispute, which has implications for universities throughout the country, centers on guidelines that Harvard adopted after 1976 disclosures about the CIA's campus activities. The disclosures were made by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, which recommended that all intelligence contacts on campuses be open instead of secret. The committee is now revising laws governing intelligence activities, and Harvard President Derek Bok wants Congress to "make it clear that these (secret) activities cannot continue and that the internal rules of academic institutions should be respected."

Bok, supported by many members of the American Association of University Professors, says he is not

asking that the substance of CIA work be disclosed, but that when the CIA works with a professor the university be informed of the relationship and that the professor not be used to recruit secretly for the CIA. Bok is especially worried about the CIA using American professors to report on and recruit foreign students, whose numbers are growing on American campuses.

The Senate committee noted in 1976 that many CIA campus contacts are not dangerous, but that the "operational use" of professors raised serious questions about the integrity of academic institutions. Affidavits filed in a recent Freedom of Information Act suit revealed that the CIA nevertheless continues its secret network of campus informants and recruiters.

Bok's principal concern is that secret intelligence activities on campus discredit the academic profession and harm academic institutions. We share that concern, and we think that Congress should accept Bok's recommendations.


--the estimates, analyses and studies which can be declassified. The other is to tighten the procedures which have been established to allow us to control dissemination of truly classified information within our organization. The policy of declassification helps us with respect to protecting the truly classified material because ~~there~~ it ensures that we are not attempting to protect unclassified things when we do not need to. I am grateful for indications of improved awareness around Headquarters of security procedures in general. In particular, the inspection of briefcases and packages being ~~brought into or taken out of our buildings~~ ^{is} going well and is making an important contribution.

(Let me have this back in the rough, please.)

Security to Combs:


BADGED
PERSONNEL
ARE ONLY
CHECKED
GOING OUT;
NEW BADGES
IN AND OUT.

STATINTL



Did Soviet Propaganda Kill the Neutron Bomb?

Was Jimmy Carter's decision not to go ahead with deployment of the neutron bomb affected by an aggressive Soviet propaganda campaign? That provocative question has arisen because of a recently published 97-page Central Intelligence Agency study on Moscow's far-reaching propa-



Above is the Lance missile which is seen as a possible delivery system for the neutron bomb.

ganda network. (The report, unfortunately, does not mention Soviet operations in the United States, contending that this is not in the CIA's province.)

Requested from the agency by Rep. John Ashbrook (R.-Ohio), the unclassified document has just been released by the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence, of which the Ohio lawmaker is a key member.

The study details the Soviets' far-flung propaganda empire, including an extensive short-wave radio system (with Soviet broadcasts to foreign listeners amounting to 2,000 hours per week); two news agencies, Tass and Novosti, with correspondents in 100 nations and furnishing news to at least 60 pro-Soviet parties in dozens of countries vital to the free world's existence; and 13 major international front organizations, such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth. The KGB, through forgery and recruiting of sympathetic journalists, also becomes part of the propaganda picture.

Soviet journalists, notes the study, are a central aspect of this operation. There are close to 500 Soviet journalists stationed abroad and, while they claim to be as independent as reporters with the Associated Press and the New York Times, they are employees of the state and, in fact, "frequently live in official Soviet residences abroad.... Some Tass and Novosti representatives double as intelligence operatives, and may be directed to recruit and handle local media assets."

Stressing the orchestration and control of all these vehicles, the CIA points out that "Soviet propaganda policy is formulated at the highest levels of the bureaucracy, with its execution tightly coordinated from Moscow. This close coordination and control ensure that the entire Soviet propaganda network is fully responsive to the demands of policymakers, and can be mobilized quickly and efficiently to disseminate whatever specific propaganda themes they desire on a worldwide basis."

To underscore the effectiveness of Soviet operations, the CIA appended to its study a special annex on how Moscow waged an aggressive verbal assault against the neutron bomb, the anti-tank missile that the President had virtually promised NATO, but then reneged on with his decision this past April to postpone production and development.

The anti-neutron bomb campaign began in Moscow in July and August of 1977, largely through intensive treatment by Soviet shortwave radio. These themes were rebroadcast in Eastern Europe, and then picked up by various Communist-front groups in the West, which held public protest meetings and demonstrations.

Said the CIA: "The broad attention paid to the subject by non-Communist Western and Third-World media thereafter can be attributed partly to stimulation by the official and semi-official campaign, supplemented by the clandestine activities of the KGB. The neutron bomb has by now become a major political issue in every European capital." In a blow-by-blow account, here's what the CIA found:

- Of some 3,000 Soviet broadcast items examined weekly last year, the number devoted to the neutron bomb issue rose from an insignificant level in early July to the point where it dominated Soviet commentary during the weeks of July 25 to August 14. No other topic came near receiving so much attention, with the campaign not only sustained by a heavy volume of words but also with specially staged dramatic events. *Pravda*, *Izvestia* and Tass kept up a rolling barrage of criticism, condemning the U.S. for even thinking of deploying a new and, supposedly, hideous weapon of war.